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Chapter V
Guidelines for Interpretation
of the WTO Covered Agreements


OUTLINE

I Introduction
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
IV The Status of Legitimate Expectations in Interpretation



I Introduction
According to Art. 11 of the DSU, the panel's role is to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. In the previous chapter, we have examined the general standard of review labeled as “an objective assessment” regarding “the facts of the case”; clearly, for panels to fulfil appropriately their functions as designated in Art. 11 of the DSU, it is also indiscerptible to make such an objective assessment of “the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. Therefore, the interpretation issue of the covered agreements arises. In this section, the author will scrutinize guidelines for interpretation applied under the WTO jurisprudence.
To resolve a particular dispute, before addressing the parties' arguments in detail, it is clearly necessary and appropriate to clarify the general issues concerning the interpretation of the relevant provisions and their application to the parties' claims. However, the complex nature of the covered agreements has given rise to difficulties in interpretation.
As noted previously, GATT/WTO jurisprudence should not be viewed in isolation from general principles developed in international law or most jurisdictions; and according to Art. 3.2 of the DSU, panels are bound by the “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” in their examination of the covered agreements. A number of recent adopted reports have repeatedly referred, as interpretative guidelines, to “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” as embodied in the text of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’), especially in its Arts. 31, 32. It is in accordance with these rules of treaty interpretation that panels or the Appellate Body have frequently examined the WTO provisions at issue, on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the terms of those provisions in their context, in the light of the object and purpose of the covered agreements and the WTO Agreement. These Vienna Convention articles provide as follows:

“Art. 31: General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

Art. 32 Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”

II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
Pursuant to Art. 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, the duty of a treaty interpreter is to determine the meaning of a term in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the term in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. As noted by the Appellate Body in its Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages (DS8/DS10/DS11), “Article 31 of provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: ‘interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty’. The provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions”. And in US ? Shrimps (DS58), the Appellate Body accordingly states: “A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought.”
More specifically, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules that: “Text, context and object-and-purpose correspond to well established textual, systemic and teleological methodologies of treaty interpretation, all of which typically come into play when interpreting complex provisions in multilateral treaties. For pragmatic reasons the normal usage, and we will follow this usage, is to start the interpretation from the ordinary meaning of the ‘raw’ text of the relevant treaty provisions and then seek to construe it in its context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. However, the elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object-and-purpose as well as good faith - are to be viewed as one holistic rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Context and object-and-purpose may often appear simply to confirm an interpretation seemingly derived from the ‘raw’ text. In reality it is always some context, even if unstated, that determines which meaning is to be taken as ‘ordinary’ and frequently it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at object-and-purpose. As noted by the Appellate Body: ‘Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: 'interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty'’. It adds, however, that ‘[t]he provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions’.” 1
In sum, as noted by the Panel in Canada-Automotive Industry (DS139/DS142), “understanding of these rules of interpretation is that, even though the text of a term is the starting-point for any interpretation, the meaning of a term cannot be found exclusively in that text; in seeking the meaning of a term, we also have to take account of its context and to consider the text of the term in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention explicitly refers to the ‘ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their [the terms'] context and in the light of its [the treaty's] object and purpose’. The three elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object and purpose - are to be viewed as one integrated rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Of course, context and object and purpose may simply confirm the textual meaning of a term. In many cases, however, it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at the context and/or object and purpose”. 2
With regard to Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention, it is repeatedly ruled that, “[t]he application of these rules in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention will usually allow a treaty interpreter to establish the meaning of a term. However, if after applying Article 31 the meaning of the term remains ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, Article 32 allows a treaty interpreter to have recourse to ‘... supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion’. With regard to 'the circumstances of [the] conclusion' of a treaty, this permits, in appropriate cases, the examination of the historical background against which the treaty was negotiated.” 3
As a whole, under the WTO jurisprudence, with regard to the dispute among the parties over the appropriate legal analysis to be applied, as general principles or guidelines of interpretation, it is often begun with Art. 3.2 of the DSU. To go further, as noted by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, “the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ are those incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). GATT panels have previously interpreted the GATT in accordance with the VCLT. The Panel noted that Article 3:2 DSU in fact codifies this previously-established practice”. Consequently, “the Panel concluded that the starting point of an interpretation of an international treaty, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in accordance with Article 31 VCLT, is the wording of the treaty. The wording should be interpreted in its context and in the light of the object and the purpose of the treaty as a whole and subsequent practice and agreements should be taken into account. Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation should be made exceptionally only under the conditions specified in Article 32 VCLT”. 4
In short, it is may be the case that, it is generally considered that the fundamental rules of treaty interpretation set out in Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have attained the status of rules of customary international law. In recent years, the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body and WTO panels has become one of the richest sources from which to receive guidance on their application.
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
The Panel Report on Turkey-Textile and Clothing Products (DS34) states concerning the conflicts issue that: 5
“As a general principle, WTO obligations are cumulative and Members must comply with all of them at all times unless there is a formal ‘conflict’ between them. This flows from the fact that the WTO Agreement is a ‘Single Undertaking’. On the definition of conflict, it should be noted that: ‘… a conflict of law-making treaties arises only where simultaneous compliance with the obligations of different instruments is impossible. ... There is no conflict if the obligations of one instrument are stricter than, but not incompatible with, those of another, or if it is possible to comply with the obligations of one instrument by refraining from exercising a privilege or discretion accorded by another’.
This principle, also referred to by Japan in its third party submission, is in conformity with the public international law presumption against conflicts which was applied by the Appellate Body in Canada - Periodicals and in EC - Bananas III, when dealing with potential overlapping coverage of GATT 1994 and GATS, and by the panel in Indonesia - Autos, in respect of the provisions of Article III of GATT, the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. In Guatemala - Cement, the Appellate Body when discussing the possibility of conflicts between the provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement and the DSU, stated: ‘A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them’.
We recall the Panel's finding in Indonesia - Autos, a dispute where Indonesia was arguing that the measures under examination were subsidies and therefore the SCM Agreement being lex specialis, was the only ‘applicable law’ (to the exclusion of other WTO provisions): ‘14.28 In considering Indonesia's defence that there is a general conflict between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and those of Article III of GATT, and consequently that the SCM Agreement is the only applicable law, we recall first that in public international law there is a presumption against conflict. This presumption is especially relevant in the WTO context since all WTO agreements, including GATT 1994 which was modified by Understandings when judged necessary, were negotiated at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum. In this context we recall the principle of effective interpretation pursuant to which all provisions of a treaty (and in the WTO system all agreements) must be given meaning, using the ordinary meaning of words.’
In light of this general principle, we will consider whether Article XXIV authorizes measures which Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC otherwise prohibit. In view of the presumption against conflicts, as recognized by panels and the Appellate Body, we bear in mind that to the extent possible, any interpretation of these provisions that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided.”
It is clearly implied by the ruling above that, in the WTO system, any interpretation of the covered agreements that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided. In this respect, as to WTO rules of conflicts, in the context that all WTO agreements were negotiated “at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum”, the principle of effective interpretation is recalled. What a principle is it?
As ruled by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverage (DS8/DS10/DS11), effective interpretation is a principle “whereby all provisions of a treaty must be, to the extent possible, given their full meaning so that parties to such a treaty can enforce their rights and obligations effectively…. this principle of interpretation prevents [the panel] from reaching a conclusion on the claims … or the defense …, or on the related provisions invoked by the parties, that would lead to a denial of either party's rights or obligations.” 6 This ruling is upheld by the Appellate Body when ruling that, “[a] fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). In United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, we noted that ‘[o]ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility’.” 7
广东省潮州市人民政府


印发《潮州市城市低收入家庭认定实施办法》的通知



各县、区人民政府（管委会），市府直属各单位，市各开发区管委会：

现将《潮州市城市低收入家庭认定实施办法》印发给你们，请认真贯彻执行。







二○一二年三月十五日







潮州市城市低收入家庭认定实施办法



第一章 总则

第一条 为规范廉租住房、经济适用房保障以及其他社会救助工作中的城市低收入家庭收入核定行为，根据国家及省有关规定，结合我市实际，制定本办法。

第二条 本办法所称城市低收入家庭，是指家庭成员均具有本市城镇户籍，家庭成员人均收入和家庭财产状况符合户籍地县、区人民政府（管委会）规定的低收入标准的城市居民家庭。

第三条 市人民政府民政部门负责全市城市低收入家庭收入核定的管理工作。县、区人民政府（管委会）民政部门以及街道办事处、镇人民政府负责城市低收入家庭收入核定的具体工作。社区居委会根据街道办事处或者镇人民政府委托，可以承担城市低收入家庭收入核定的日常服务工作。

第四条 发展和改革、公安、财政、人力资源和社会保障、住房和城乡建设、房管、税务、工商行政管理、统计等行政机关以及相关金融机构、工会组织，按照各自职责，共同做好城市低收入家庭收入核定工作。

第五条 县、区人民政府（管委会）应当加强城市低收入家庭收入核定工作机构能力建设，配备必要工作人员。

第二章 城市低收入家庭的认定标准

第六条 城市低收入家庭收入标准包括家庭收入和家庭财产两项指标。

第七条 城市低收入家庭收入标准实行动态管理，由县、区人民政府（管委会）每年向社会公布一次。

第八条 有下列情形之一的，不能认定为城市低收入家庭：

（一）拥有非维持家庭基本生活需要的汽车等高档消费品；

（二）五年内购买有明显超出基本生活需求的高档商品房；

（三）家庭成员有劳动能力而不按要求进行求职登记，或虽进行了登记，但无正当理由在一年内两次不接受就业服务机构介绍就业的；

（四）家庭成员在高消费非公幼儿园入托，或在中小学自费择校就读，或由家庭出资自费出国留学的；

（五）故意放弃或不向法定义务人主张法定赡养、抚（扶）养费的；

（六）放弃个人财产权利或无偿、不合理低价处置个人资产的；

（七）家庭成员违法生育且未处理终结的；

（八）经民政部门认定的其他不符合低收入家庭条件的。

第三章 家庭成员和家庭收入的核定

第九条 城市低收入家庭成员，是指登记在同一城镇户籍，具有法定赡养、抚养或扶养关系且共同生活的人员。

共同生活是指所有家庭成员吃、住等日常生活在一起，在外临时务工但回原籍后仍共同生活，及在外地读书的大中专学生、服现役义务兵，可视为共同生活。

第十条 户籍在一起，但能够独立构成两个或两个以上家庭的，可以分别按各自的家庭进行申请，并分别核定各自的家庭收入和家庭财产。

第十一条 家庭收入是指某家庭自提出城市低收入家庭认定申请当月的前6个月，所有家庭成员拥有的全部可支配收入，包括扣除缴纳的个人所得税以及个人缴纳的社会保障支出后的工薪收入、经营性净收入、财产性收入和转移性收入等。

（一）工薪收入：主要包括工资（按国家统计局规定的工资总额范围）以及兼职、兼业收入和从事各种技艺、各项劳动服务所得的报酬；

（二）经营性净收入：指个体、私营业主等在工商登记机关依法登记取得营业执照，合法经营取得的收入扣除从事生产和非生产经营费用支出、缴纳税款等，可直接用于生产性、非生产性建设投资、生活消费和积蓄的收入；

（三）财产性收入：

1、投资收入。包括银行存款利息收入、有价证券股息红利收入、保险受益和其他投资受益；

2、出租资产收入。将家庭拥有的房屋、车辆、土地等资产出租产生的收入；

3、知识产权收入。自己创作、发明或者参与创作、发明、并归个人所有的著作权、专利权、专有技术等带来的收入，专利人将专利权让给他人或许可他人在一定的时间和范围内使用其专利所得的个人收入和非专利技术所有者将非专利技术有偿地提供、转让他人所取得的个人收入；

4、出售财物收入。主要包括出售住房收入、因建设征地农转非等原因领取一次性经济补偿金和安置补助费、拆迁安置房屋货币补偿收入和出售其他物品收入；

5、借贷收入。主要包括提取储蓄存款、收回借款、收回储蓄性保险本金、兑售有价证券、收回投资本金、其他借贷收入等。

（四）转移性收入。主要包括离（退）休金、失业保险金、遗属补助费、赔偿收入、因劳动合同终止（解除）所获得的经济补偿金（生活补助费、一次性安置费）、赡养费、抚（扶）养费、提取住房公积金、接受馈赠收入、继承收入等。

（五）经认定应计入家庭收入的其他收入。

第十二条 收入的统计标准以实际发生的数额为准，无论收入是补发还是实发。

第十三条 以下项目不计入家庭收入：

（一）优抚对象按规定享受的抚恤金、补助金、护理费、保健金、优待金、义务兵的退伍费；

（二）计划生育奖励和扶助金；

（三）见义勇为奖励金；

（四）市级以上劳动模范离（退）休后享受的荣誉津贴；

（五）因工（公）负伤人员的护理费；对身体健康有害的特殊工作岗位的特岗补贴；

（六）因工（公）死亡人员及其家属享受的一次性抚恤金、丧葬费；

（七）按规定由个人缴纳的住房公积金和各项社会保险统筹费；

（八）政府和社会给予贫困在校生的救助金、生活补帖和在校学生获得的奖学金、助学贷款等；

（九）人身伤害赔偿中除生活费以外的部分；

（十）政府和社会给予的医疗救助金；

（十一）依法不应计入家庭收入的其他收入。

第十四条 对工薪收入的调查评估按照以下规定执行：

（一）在职职工工资收入。由职工所在单位劳资部门出具职工收入情况证明，并经单位盖章认定。对连续6个月以上未领到或未足额领到工资的在职职工，按实际收入计算；

（二）工资以外的劳动收入。由个人诚信申报，街道办事处（镇人民政府）根据其所从事的社会劳动情况评估确定。

第十五条 对经营性净收入，由个体经营、私营企业者诚信申报，街道办事处（镇人民政府）调查评估确定。

第十六条 对财产性收入的调查评估按照以下规定执行：

（一）利息收入、股息红利收入、保险受益和其他投资受益。由申请人家庭成员诚信申报，街道办事处（镇人民政府）调查评估确定。

（二）出租资产收入、知识产权收入、出售财产收入。按照相关合同核定收入，合同价款明显低于市场价格的，由街道办事处（镇人民政府）评估确定。

（三）借贷收入。由申请人家庭成员诚信申报，街道办事处（镇人民政府）调查评估确定。

第十七条 对转移性收入的调查评估按照以下规定执行：

（一）离（退）休金。凭本人离（退）休金领取存折予以认定；

（二）失业人员失业保险金。凭本人《失业证》予以认定；

（三）遗属补助费。凭单位开具的遗属补助费证明等予以认定；

（四）赔偿收入。凭人民法院调解书、判决书或其它证明文件予以认定；

（五）经济补偿金（安置费）。凭用人单位解除（终止）劳动合同证明文件以及发放证明资料等予以认定；

（六）赡养费和扶（抚）养费。赡养费和扶（抚）养费按照有关协议、裁决、判决的数额计算。没有协议、裁决、判决的，赡养费、扶（抚）养费根据实际评估认定；法定赡养、扶（抚）养义务人属低保对象的，不计算其应付赡养、扶（抚）养费。

（七）提取住房公积金。由被调查人提供住房公积金管理机构出具的凭证予以认定；

（八）接受馈赠收入。由被调查人诚信申报，街道办事处（镇人民政府）进行评估认定；

（九）继承收入。继承房产等不动产不列入收入，除不动产以外的其他继承收入由申请人诚信申报，街道办事处（镇人民政府）评估确定。

第十八条 家庭财产是指家庭成员拥有的全部存款、房产、车辆、有价证券等财产。家庭财产的认定以街道办事处（镇人民政府）调查核定时的现状为准。申请城市低收入家庭认定时应诚信申报家庭财产，街道办事处（镇人民政府）经调查评估确定。

第四章 城市低收入家庭的申报和认定

第十九条 城市低收入家庭的申报实行属地管理，由申请人向户籍所在地的街道办事处（镇人民政府）提出书面申请。

申请时应提供以下材料：

（一）家庭户口薄、家庭成员身份证及复印件；

（二）家庭成员收入证明；

（三）家庭成员关系证明；

（四）家庭财产清单及房产证等有关财产证明材料；

（五）县、区政府（管委会）民政部门要求提供的其他材料。

申请材料不齐全需要补正的，经办机构应当一次性告知需要补正的全部材料。

街道办事处（镇人民政府）对材料齐全的城市低收入家庭认定申请应当受理，街道办事处（镇人民政府）不受理的，县、区人民政府应当责令其限期受理。

第二十条 城市低收入家庭认定程序：

（一）初审。街道办事处（镇人民政府）对申请人的家庭收入和经济状况进行初审，经调查核实后张榜公示，公示时间不少于7日。公示后无异议的，由街道办事处（镇人民政府）签署初审意见，连同全部证明材料一并报县、区政府（管委会）民政部门审批。对初审不同意认定为城市低收入家庭的，应通知申请人本人，并说明理由。

（二）审批。县、区政府（管委会）民政部门收到街道办事处（镇人民政府）上报的城市低收入家庭申报材料后，应当在7日内进行复审；并将符合条件的申请对象在本单位公告栏、县、区政府（管委会）公众信息网公示，公示时间不少于7日。公示后无异议的，予以审批，并出具城市低收入家庭核定证明。复审不合格的，退回报送申请的街道办事处（镇人民政府），并说明理由。

第二十一条 城市低收入家庭初审及审批的工作时限均为15个工作日，但申请材料不全的除外。

第二十二条 街道办事处（镇人民政府）应成立城市低收入家庭调查评估小组，负责对申请家庭进行调查核实，对城市低收入家庭资格进行评估认定。调查评估小组组成人员不少于5人。调查评估小组组成人员应当对调查评估结论形成一致意见。

第二十三条 调查核实申请家庭的收入和财产情况，可以采取入户调查、信息查证、邻里访问以及信函索证等方式。有关个人、单位、组织应当积极配合，并如实提供有关情况。

第二十四条 申请认定的家庭应当积极配合县、区政府（管委会）民政部门、街道办事处（镇人民政府）等单位的调查，并主动到所在单位及相关部门申请出具相关证明材料，及时送交有关审核认定单位。

审核认定城市低收入家庭的经办工作人员应当对申请人提供的材料逐项核对，根据需要留存复印件或征得申请人同意留存原件。

第二十五条 申请认定的家庭应书面授权县、区政府（管委会）民政部门、街道办事处（镇人民政府），对家庭成员的收入和财产状况进行查询。

公安、劳动保障、住房城乡建设、房管、金融、工商、税务、住房公积金等单位对城市低收入家庭审核认定单位的查询应当予以配合。

第二十六条 城市居民最低生活保障家庭可直接认定为城市低收入家庭，不必重复进行家庭收入认定。

第五章 监督管理

第二十七条 城市低收入家庭收入状况发生变化，不符合低收入家庭条件的，应取消其城市低收入家庭资格。

第二十八条 对城市低收入家庭每年复核一次。复核程序如下：

（一）已认定的城市低收入家庭应于每年3月向所在街道办事处（镇人民政府）申报上年度家庭收入、财产变动情况，申请复核城市低收入家庭资格；

（二）街道办事处（镇人民政府）经对申报情况进行调查核实，提出维持或取消城市低收入家庭资格的意见，报县、区政府（管委会）民政部门复查；

（三）县、区政府（管委会）民政部门应当根据城市低收入家庭人口、收入、财产的变动情况，重新出具家庭收入核定证明。不再符合城市低收入家庭认定标准的，应及时反馈给同级有关专项救助管理部门、住房保障实施机构。

城市低收入家庭未按规定申请复核的，城市低收入家庭资格从应当申请复核的次月起终止。

第二十九条 县、区政府（管委会）民政部门应当按户建立城市低收入家庭纸质和电子档案，记载城市低收入家庭的人口、收入、财产和变动情况，以及享受廉租住房、经济适应住房保障或者其他社会救助的情况，并及时登记归档。

第三十条 县、区政府（管委会）民政部门、街道办事处（镇人民政府）应设立城市低收入家庭认定举报箱或举报电话，接受群众和社会监督。

第三十一条 各县、区应当逐步建立健全城市低收入家庭收入审核管理信息系统，有效利用公安、人力资源和社会保障、住房和城乡建设、金融、工商、税务、住房公积金等政府部门及有关机构的数据，实现信息共享，方便信息比对和核查，建立科学高效的收入审核管理信息平台。

第六章 法律责任

第三十二条 申请城市低收入核定的家庭不如实提供相关情况、隐瞒家庭收入和财产、骗取城市低收入家庭待遇的，由县、区政府（管委会）民政部门取消已出具的家庭收入认定证明，并记入人民银行企业和个人信用信息基础数据库及有关部门建立的诚信体系，同时依法追缴被骗取的社会救助款物。

第三十三条 国家机关、企事业单位、社会团体、村（居）委会以及其他社会组织，不如实提供申请城市低收入核定的家庭及家庭成员的有关情况，或者出具虚假证明的，由县、区政府（管委会）民政部门提请其上级主管机关或有关部门依照法律法规有关规定处理，并记入人民银行企业和个人信用信息基础数据库及有关部门建立的诚信体系。

第三十四条 城市低收入家庭审核认定工作人员玩忽职守、滥用职权、徇私舞弊的，依法给予行政处分；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。

第七章 附则

第三十五条 本办法自颁布之日起施行，有效期5年。